Creepy Jar Q3 2025: Profits Hold Up While Green Hell Ages And StarRupture Still Sits Offstage

Creepy Jar’s Q3 2025 shows shrinking revenue but resilient profits, underscoring heavy dependence on Green Hell and execution risk around upcoming StarRupture.
Creepy Jar Q3 2025: Profits Hold Up While Green Hell Ages And StarRupture Still Sits Offstage
Executive Summary
The elephant in the room for Creepy Jar’s Q3 2025 results is simple:
the core business is shrinking at the top line while profits stay high only because costs remain unusually lean and the studio rides an aging hit.
Based on the company’s consolidated statement of profit and loss for the period ended 30 September 2025, net sales for the first nine months of 2025 fell from PLN 22.8m to PLN 19.6m year-over-year (–14.0%), even as operating profit rose from PLN 8.4m to PLN 9.7m and net profit increased from PLN 9.7m to PLN 10.9m. The full-year narrative is flattering: margins are expanding, and profitability remains robust despite the absence of a new release.
However, a look at the current quarter is more troubling. External data for Q3 2025 indicate revenue of roughly PLN 5.6m versus PLN 7.9m a year earlier (around –29% YoY) and a net profit decline from about PLN 3.5m to PLN 2.6m (≈–26% YoY). The 9M numbers are being held up by earlier quarters and non-operating effects, while the latest quarter itself clearly signals deceleration.
The studio still leans heavily on Green Hell, a multi-platform survival title originally released in 2019 that continues to generate long-tail revenue, lately boosted by current-gen console and VR versions. Meanwhile, the next major project, StarRupture, remains in development with Early Access planned for autumn 2025, i.e. after the Q3 reporting date.
For investors, the verdict is cautiously bearish: Creepy Jar remains nicely profitable, but Q3 shows that the Green Hell cash engine is past its peak, while the company is about to enter the most capital-intensive phase of StarRupture with no fresh revenue driver yet in market.
Key Financial Metrics (YoY)
The table below focuses on year-over-year performance for the quarter, using external market data for Q3 2025 and Q3 2024, and on 9M trends derived from the company’s condensed financial statements.
Q3 2025 vs Q3 2024 (in PLN m)
| Metric | Q3 2025 | Q3 2024 | YoY Change | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (net sales) | 5.6 | 7.9 | –29.1% | Clear evidence of Green Hell’s maturing long tail. |
| Operating profit (EBIT) | 2.1 | 3.3 | –36.4% | Profit falls faster than revenue as fixed costs dominate. |
| Net profit | 2.6 | 3.5 | –25.7% | Still solid margin, but unmistakably down YoY. |
9M 2025 vs 9M 2024 (in PLN k, from report)
| Metric | 9M 2025 | 9M 2024 | YoY Change | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (net sales) | 19,599 | 22,788 | –14.0% | Double-digit decline despite Green Hell still on multiple platforms. |
| Operating profit (z działalności oper.) | 9,695 | 8,410 | +15.3% | Cost discipline and high-margin back catalogue sustain EBIT. |
| Net profit | 10,937 | 9,673 | +13.1% | Strong bottom line despite shrinking sales; not a sustainable pattern. |
The key message: Creepy Jar is squeezing more profit from a smaller revenue base. That is not inherently bad, but in a content-driven industry, it is not a state that can last indefinitely without new commercially successful releases.
Portfolio Performance
Green Hell: A Strong But Aging Cash Engine
Green Hell remains the backbone of Creepy Jar’s financial profile. Launched in 2019 and later ported to consoles (including PS5/Xbox Series) and VR platforms, it has enjoyed a long revenue tail and continues to be well-received, with a “Very Positive” user rating on Steam. From an investor standpoint, Green Hell sits firmly in the late-maturity phase:
-
Positives:
- Ongoing sales across PC, console and VR ecosystems.
- Cooperative mode and expansions that extend engagement and keep the title visible.
- Very strong margins, as the bulk of development costs are already amortized.
-
Negatives:
- YoY revenue contraction indicates that even with new platform launches, incremental gains are no longer offsetting the natural decay of an older survival title.
- Marketing spends on Green Hell now have diminishing marginal returns; every złoty spent buys less incremental revenue than in earlier years.
In Q3 2025, there is no evidence of a new Green Hell-sized catalyst. Revenue decline suggests that boosts from recent console launches are fading faster than anticipated.
StarRupture: Ambitious Successor Still Pre-Revenue
StarRupture is positioned as Creepy Jar’s second major survival IP: an Unreal Engine 5, open-world, construction and management survival game with single-player and multiplayer modes. Early Access on Steam is planned for autumn 2025, with the Q3 report period ending just before that.
From a portfolio perspective:
- StarRupture is strategically essential: without it, Creepy Jar remains effectively a single-IP studio.
- The project has been in development since 2019, implying substantial capitalized development costs and a long payback horizon.
- Until Early Access launches and early user sentiment crystallizes, StarRupture contributes only costs and risk, not revenue.
In short, Q3 2025 is the uncomfortable transition phase: Green Hell is past its peak, StarRupture has not yet started contributing, and the P&L is balanced on cost control rather than growth.
Future Outlook & Pipeline
Near-Term: Early Access for StarRupture
With Early Access planned for autumn 2025, the next 12 months will hinge on:
- Initial reception and Steam metrics for StarRupture (wishlists, reviews, concurrent players).
- The studio’s ability to iterate quickly based on community feedback.
- Conversion of Early Access visibility into meaningful revenue, without overly deep discounts that would erode margins.
The timeline is inherently risky:
- Any material delay into 2026 would extend the period of revenue stagnation while costs continue to accrue.
- Even if StarRupture launches on schedule, survival games are a crowded segment; only a small subset achieve the kind of durable traction Green Hell enjoyed.
Medium-Term: Platform Expansion, But Limited Diversification
Creepy Jar’s history with Green Hell shows competence in multi-platform rollouts, including console and VR. It is reasonable to expect a similar approach for StarRupture if Early Access is successful. However:
- The pipeline remains concentrated: StarRupture is the only major announced project after Green Hell.
- There is no sign in current disclosures of a broader slate (e.g., smaller AA/indie co-publishing deals) that could smooth earnings between flagship releases.
Investors should therefore assume that Creepy Jar’s earnings profile will stay “lumpy”, with long quiet periods between major launches.
Risk Assessment
Key risks that emerge from the Q3 2025 picture include:
-
Single-IP Dependency (Transitioning to Dual-IP):
Until StarRupture proves itself commercially, Creepy Jar effectively remains a Green Hell studio. Any further erosion in Green Hell revenue directly hits the top line. -
Execution Risk on StarRupture:
Multi-year survival projects in Early Access face high execution risk. If StarRupture fails to differentiate in a crowded genre, or if technical issues plague Early Access, the game may underperform despite a long and costly development. -
Revenue Compression vs. Fixed Cost Base:
Q3 already shows what happens when revenue dips: operating profit falls faster, as overheads are relatively fixed in the short term. Without growth, margins will start to compress. -
Valuation Sensitivity to Pipeline Newsflow:
As a small, publicly listed studio, Creepy Jar’s share price is tightly linked to newsflow around its IP. Any delay, negative preview, or weak early sales for StarRupture could trigger disproportionate market reactions. -
Currency and Market Liquidity:
With operations and reporting in PLN and a listing on the Warsaw market, foreign investors face FX risk and relatively low trading liquidity compared to larger global publishers.
Management Commentary
While this report offers limited direct quotations compared to a full narrative MD&A, the structure and emphasis of the disclosures are telling:
- The document clearly highlights Green Hell and StarRupture as the only truly central products, reinforcing the concentration risk.
- The strong focus on net profit growth and positive 9M margins risks obscuring the underlying double-digit revenue decline and the sharp drop in the current quarter.
From a forensic perspective, the most notable omission is a detailed breakdown of revenue drivers:
- There is no granular split between PC, console, and VR for Green Hell.
- Nor is there a quantified disclosure of how much of 9M 2025 profit is driven by one-off factors (e.g., currency gains, government grants, or non-cash items) versus recurring, sustainable earnings.
The tone is therefore more promotional than analytical: management can legitimately claim that profits are up, but the structural question—how to replace Green Hell long term—is left largely unanswered in the Q3 materials.
Conclusion
Creepy Jar’s Q3 2025 results paint a nuanced picture:
- On the surface, the company remains comfortably profitable, with 9M net income up more than 13% despite lower revenue.
- Underneath, the core business is slowing, as shown by the near-30% drop in quarterly revenue and significant declines in operating and net profit for Q3 itself.
- The entire mid-term investment case now revolves around whether StarRupture can become a second Green Hell—or at least a meaningfully profitable complement—without overextending the studio’s resources.
For game-industry investors, the setup is finely balanced:
- If StarRupture lands well in Early Access and builds strong, persistent engagement, Creepy Jar could pivot from a single-IP cash cow to a more robust, dual-franchise studio.
- If not, Q3 2025 may come to be seen as an early warning that Green Hell’s golden years are behind it, with no equally strong successor ready to take over.
Until Early Access data for StarRupture is in hand, a disciplined, risk-aware stance on Creepy Jar seems appropriate: respect the quality of past execution and current profitability, but price in the very real risk that the next act may not repeat the first.